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Rational and Emotive Disclosure 2 
Abstract 
The aim of this research was to examine the underlying cognitive processes as 
well as the physiological outcomes of disclosing traumatic events. Epstein (1973, 1991, 
1994, 1998) has argued the existence of two fundamental modes of cognitive processing: 
a rational mode that involves higher brain functioning and is reason-oriented, and an 
experiential mode that involves lower brain functioning and is pleasure-pain oriented. 
We examined the hypothesis that fact-based disclosure invokes rational processing while 
emotion-based disclosure invokes experiential processing by examining participants' 
physiological reactivity during as well as their behavior in a decision-making task 
following written disclosure. Based on previous findings suggesting that events 
involving high vs. low brain functioning involve different types ofphysiological 
activation (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991), I proposed the following: First, 
emotion-based retelling would result in a uniform pattern of autonomic activity across 
subjects, marked by an increase in sympathetic (SNS) activity coupled with a decrease iIi 
parasympathetic (PNS) activity. Conversely, fact-based retelling would result in diverse 
SNS and PNS activity between subjects, including an increase in SNS activity with no 
change in PNS activity, and a decrease in PNS activity with no change in SNS activity. 
Second, emotion-based retelling would result in more nonoptimal than optimal choices in 
the decision-making task, while fact-based retelling would result in more optimal than 
nonoptimal choices in the task. Sixty undergraduates at a private, liberal arts university 
wrote about either a personally traumatic life event or a trivial topic for ten minutes and 
then participated in a decision-making task modeled after Epstein's ratio-bias (RB) 
paradigm. Impedance cardiography and a blood pressure cuffwere employed to examine 
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autonomic arousal, such as heart rate (HR) , blood pressure (BP), respiratory sinus 
arrhythmia (RSA), and pre-ejection period (PEP) throughout the study. In partial support 
of our hypotheses, results indicated a significant degree of coupling between the PNS and 
SNS for those participants who wrote only about the emotions surrounding their trauma. 
Significant differences in the RB paradigm were found only in trial! of the task, with 
those writing about both the facts and emotions surrounding their trauma and those 
writing about trivial topics making the most optimal choices. Although these findings are 
promising rather than definitive, they suggest that the type of writing regarding a 
traumatic event invokes different cognitive and physiological processes. 
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Cognitive and Physiological Processes Underlying Written Disclosure 
"I think ofwriting as a battle between my consciousness and my 
subconscious...that's my escape" O'Jikida's response, Magee, 1999). This was one 
participant's response in a study that examined the role ofwritten disclosure among 
female adolescents (Magee, 1999). In addition to serving as an escape, Magee (1999) 
found that young adults disclose traumatic events for a variety of reasons: To identify 
emotions, reflect upon the experience, and release sentiments of pain and anger. 
Research indicates that the outcomes accompanying disclosure of traumatic events 
surpass psychological benefits alone (Petronio, 2000; Pennebaker, 1995; Pennebaker, 
Hughes, & O'Heeron, 1987; Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). More specifically, emotional 
disclosure of traumatic events has been associated with short-term cardiovascular 
reactivity as well as long-term physical benefits, such as improved immune functioning 
and fewer visits to the health center (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, 1995; 
Petronio, 2000). For example, Pennebaker & Beall (1986) examined the physiological 
outcomes related to fact-based versus emotion-based disclosure of a traumatic event. All 
participants wrote about a personally traumatic event for fifteen minutes on four 
consecutive days. Those in the emotion-based group were asked to write about the 
feelings surrounding a personal trauma, while those in the fact-based group were asked to 
describe a personal trauma in a narrative fashion without referring to any personal 
feelings. Results indicated that those who wrote about the emotions surrounding a 
traumatic event displayed temporary increases in blood pressure as well as reductions in 
illness in the six months following the study as compared to those who wrote about the 
facts surrounding a traumatic experience. (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986). 
5 Rational and Emotive Disclosure 
The aim of the current study is to examine how disclosure fits into a larger model 
of cognitive processing. One model of cognitive processing is contained within Epstein's 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) (Epstein 1973; 1991; 1994; 1998). CEST 
asserts that humans rely upon two distinct yet parallel information processors, rational 
and experiential, to make sense of the world. The rational mode involves higher brain 
functioning and is driven by reason and deliberative thought, whereas the experiential 
mode involves lower brain functioning and is driven by affect (the pleasure-pain 
principle) and heuristics (Epstein, 1994). This study tested the proposition that disclosure 
is a function ofexperiential processing by examining the behavioral and physiological 
outcomes ofwritten disclosure. 
Experiential versus Rational Processing 
Epstein's Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (1973) is a global theory of 
personality that proposes the existence of two parallel, interactive systems through which 
people understand and adapt to the world: A rational system and an experiential system. 
While all behavior and conscious thought are believed to result from the joint function of 
the two information processing systems, certain experiences more heavily engage one 
system over another (Epstein, 1994). The degree of dominance of each system is 
influenced by various factors, such as the nature of the event, individual differences in 
styles of thinking, and the degree ofemotional involvement (Epstein, 1994). For 
example, emotional arousal and relevant experience are believed to increase relative 
engagement of the experiential system, while solving mathematics problems is believed 
to increase relative engagement ofthe rational system. While the two systems normally 
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collaborate in a seamless and interactive manner, they sometimes conflict. This conflict 
is experienced as a struggle between thoughts and feelings. 
According to CEST (Epstein, 1994, 1998), the experiential system represents 
lower brain functioning and is a highly adaptive system that has evolved in human-like 
ancestors for over seven million years. It operates similarly in humans and nonhumans 
yet is more complex in humans, who have a more highly developed cerebral cortex and 
can use language. At its lower levels ofoperation, it is a crude system that automatically, 
rapidly, effortlessly, and efficiently processes infonnation. The experiential system is 
experienced passively and relies primarily upon cognitive heuristics in detennining 
thoughts and behavior. It is the human "default" option of the brain, resisting change and 
often functioning according to broad generalizations and the pleasure-pain principle (i.e., 
what feels good). Moreover, a fundamental distinction between the rational and 
experiential systems lies in the fact that the experiential system is intimately associated 
with affect and experience and the rational system with logic and reason. 
The rational system is an evolutionarily newer system that dates back 
approximately 5,000 years and involves higher brain functioning (Epstein, 1998). It 
encodes reality in symbols, codes, and numbers and operates primarily in the medium of 
language. Because the use of written symbols, signs, and numbers is estimated to be less 
than 5,000 years old, the rational system is believed to be evolutionarily newer than the 
experiential system (Epstein, 1998). The rational system is a deliberative, effortful, 
abstract system that is experienced actively and consciously (Epstein, 1998). In contrast 
to the experiential system, the rational system is capable ofhigh levels of abstraction and 
long-tenn delay of gratification. Furthennore, it is analytical, logical, and driven 
•
 
Rational and Emotive Disclosure 7 
primarily by reason and higher-order thinking. A detailed comparison of the rational and 
experiential systems can be viewed in Table 1 (Epstein, 1994, 1998). 
Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory and Behavior 
As previously stated, Epstein proposes that all behavior typically results from a 
parallel, interactive collaboration of the experiential and rational systems (Epstein, 1998). 
The relative contribution of each mode varies from none at all to complete dominance 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999). Under most circumstances, both systems operate 
synchronously, giving the appearance ofa single process in function. Emotional 
involvement and relevant past experiences, however, shift the balance of influence in the 
direction of the experiential system (Epstein, 1998). Furthermore, certain conditions, 
such as individual differences in thinking styles and situational variables, result in a 
conflict between the two modes, distinguishing the qualities ofone mode over the other 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
While both systems are typically involved in determining behavior, Epstein 
asserts that the automatic processing of the experiential system is dominant over the 
rational system (Epstein, 1994). It is the effortless, efficient, more compelling "default" 
option of the brain that precedes and significantly influences the rational system (Epstein, 
1994). Moreover, because the experiential system is intimately associated with affect, it 
is likely to be experienced as more compelling and passionate than logical thinking. 
Finally, because the influence of the experiential system is usually outside of awareness, 
it is not controlled by the rational system, as the individual is not aware that there is 
anything to control (Epstein, 1998). 
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Because the experiential system is driven by the pleasure-pain principle, 
dominance of the experiential system over the rational system often occurs in the 
presence of emotionally stimulating experiences. For example, when a person responds 
to an emotionally stimulating event, the following sequence of actions is believed to 
occur: The experiential system automatically searches its memory for related experiences 
and their "emotional accompaniments" (Epstein, 1994). Next, the recalled feelings result 
in further processing and reactions, which in subhuman animals are actions and in 
humans are conscious and unconscious thoughts and behaviors. If the related 
experiences stored in the memory bank are positive, then actions intended to reproduce 
the feelings are initiated. If the related stored experiences are negative, then actions are 
initiated in attempts to avoid the negative feelings (Epstein, 1994). Epstein asserts that in 
such emotionally stimulating events, the engagement of the rational system is minimal to 
none (Epstein, 1998). Consequently, this may be why individuals often respond in 
irrational, passionate, impulsive ways to experiences that are close to their hearts. 
Historical and Research Support for the Existence ofTwo Cognitive Systems 
Epstein (1994) claims that research from a variety ofdisciplines supports the 
existence of two fundamentally distinct cognitive systems. Historically, the earliest 
support for two cognitive systems dates back to Socrates, who, in Plato's Republic, 
recognized and discussed a conflict between desire and reason that is analogous to the 
conflict between the experiential and rational systems. In the realm ofpsychology, the 
most influential division of the mind has been Freud's psychoanalytic distinction between 
primary and secondary processes. Freud posited a distinction between the id, or the 
human unconscious that functions according to primary processes (the pleasure 
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principle), and the ego, the human consciousness that functions according to secondary 
processes (the reality principle). A variety ofother psychologists have also suggested a 
distinction between two types of information-processors. For example, Pavlov (as cited 
in Epstein, 1994) proposed a distinction between a first and second signaling system, the 
former including nonverbal conditioning and the latter verbally mediated processes. 
Similarly, Labouvie-Vief(1989, 1990) distinguished between logos, a rational, analytical 
mode of information processing, and mythos, and intuitive, holistic mode (as cited in 
Epstein, 1994). Social psychologists Tversky and Kahneman (1974, 1983) introduced the 
concept ofheuristics, or cognitive shortcuts, to conclude that there were two common 
forms of reasoning-a natural, intuitive mode and an extensional, logical mode. 
Furthermore, Bargh (1989), Higgins (1989), and Swann (Swann, 1984; Swann, Hixon, 
Stein-Seroussi, & Gilbert, 1990) demonstrated the existence ofan automatic, 
preconscious processing that operates according to different rules than deliberative, 
conscious processing (as cited in Epstein, 1994). Thus, Epstein claims that the distinction 
between two fundamentally different modes ofprocessing has been posited by a variety 
ofresearchers dating back to Socrates and Freud. 
Everyday Behaviors as Support for Two Cognitive Systems 
In addition to historical and research support, Epstein cites a variety of everyday 
human behaviors as support for the existence of a rational and experiential mode of 
processing (Epstein, 1973, 1994). Epstein points to the influence of emotions upon 
thinking as a prime illustration. For example, when experiencing intense emotions, many 
have heard the advice, "Get a grip on yourself, you're too emotional to think straight." 
According to Epstein, such advice illustrates that people are intrinsically aware of two 
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different modes of information processing, one that is emotionally driven and one that is 
rationally driven (Epstein, 1994). 
Similarly, Epstein asserts that the influence of thinking upon emotions people's 
emotions also supports the distinction between the rational and experiential systems. 
According to him, people's emotions are a result oftheir interpretation of an event as 
opposed to the event itself (Epstein, 1994). For example, if a person interprets an action 
directed at him or her as unwarranted and deserving ofpunishment, the person will most 
likely feel angry. On the other hand, if the same action is interpreted as a serious threat to 
life from which escape is the desired response, the person will more likely feel frightened 
(e.g., Avail, 1980; Beck, 1976; Ellis, 1973; Epstein, 1984; Lazarus, 1982, as cited in 
Epstein, 1994). The preconscious processes that result in human evaluation and 
interpretation of daily events occur rapidly and automatically and precede the 
deliberative, linear, analytical thinking that is characteristic of the rational system 
(Epstein, 1994). Thus, Epstein asserts that such automatic, preconscious thinking 
suggests an information processing system that operates by different principles as 
compared to a deliberative, analytical method of thought. 
Furthermore, Epstein points to the difference between insight and intellectual 
knowledge as further support for two cognitive systems. For example, researchers have 
shown that deriving knowledge experientially (via experience) is often more compelling 
and more likely to influence behavior than abstract knowledge (Brewin, 1989; Fazio & 
Zanna, 1981; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977 as cited in Epstein, 1994). Information gained 
through personally meaningful experience has been shown to be more effective in 
changing feelings and behavior than information acquired through textbooks or lectures 
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(Epstein, 1994). Thus, Epstein asserts that the observation that there are two different 
types ofknowledge, intellectual and insightful, parallels the idea that there are two kinds 
of information processors, analytic-rational and intuitive-experiential (Epstein, 1994). 
Moreover, Epstein points to human beliefs such as irrational fears as further 
support for the existence of two modes ofprocessing. First, irrational fears provide an 
automatic, illogical way ofprocessing information (Epstein, 1994). People often 
acknowledge that such fears are irrational yet still maintain them. For example, those 
who make great efforts to drive everywhere in an attempt to avoid flying realize that 
statistically speaking, their fear is irrational. They are at greater risk ofharm when 
driving as opposed to flying, yet they feel safer in a situation that they know intellectually 
to be more dangerous. According to Epstein, such an acknowledged discrepancy 
provides support for the existence of two different modes ofprocessing. 
In addition, Epstein claims that superstitious thinking supports the idea that 
humans' thoughts do not rely solely upon an intellectual, rational system. A recent 
Gallup poll surveyed 1,236 adults to find that one in four reported believing in ghosts, 
one in six said reported communicating with someone deceased, one in four reported 
communicating telepathically with someone, and one in seven believed they had seen a 
UFO (Epstein, 1994). Such data illustrate that irrational thinking is common and that 
beliefs are not composed solely of factual or rational information. 
Empirical Research on Heuristic Processing in Support ofCognitive-Experiential Self­
Theory 
In addition to everyday behaviors, Epstein uses a variety of research on heuristic­
based processing as further support for CEST. Heuristic processing refers to the use of 
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cognitive shortcuts for making decisions under situations ofuncertainty. Heuristic 
processing can but does not necessarily occur under emotionally stimulating 
circumstances (Epstein, 1991). Much of the work on heuristic processing is based upon 
work done by Tversky and Kahneman (1974; 1983) which demonstrates that people often 
think in heuristic ways that are automatic, rapid, and efficient yet sometimes produce 
errors when judged against logical standards (Epstein, 1991). A series of studies 
conducted by Sloat (1992) and Epstein et al. (1992; 1993; 1994; 1999) found that 
individuals engaged in a variety ofheuristic-based processing, as demonstrated by 
arbitrary-outcome-oriented processing, sequential processing, and the ratio-bias 
phenomenon. According to Epstein and his colleagues (1994), such heuristic-based 
processing further supports the existence of a rational and experiential information 
processor as proposed by CEST. 
Arbitrary-outcome-oriented processing. Epstein et al. (1992) modeled this study 
after a study conducted by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). In the original Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983) study, participants were asked to imagine a scenario in which two 
individuals arrive at the airport thirty minutes after their scheduled departure time. One 
individual realizes that her flight left on time, while the other learns that, due to a delay, 
her flight just left a few minutes ago. Despite the fact that from a logical perspective, the 
differences in the two situations should not matter, participants consistently reported that 
they would be more upset in the latter condition (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
Epstein suggests that this behavior supports the existence of two different modes 
of processing. As illustrated, emotion-provoking stimuli, such as imagining that one has 
missed his/her flight, caused people to consciously disregard reason and rely solely upon 
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automatic, irrational, experiential processing. According to Epstein, these results also 
support the idea that the experiential system is associationistic; in other words, the 
experiential system connects events by similarity and proximity as opposed to an 
understanding ofcausality. This was demonstrated by the effect that heuristic, or 
experiential, processing had upon the rational system. As evidenced in the Tversky and 
Kahneman study (1983), heuristic processing led people to judge events that were 
arbitrarily related as causally related. 
Sequential processing. To support the claim that the experiential system is a 
rapid, automatic information processor that precedes the functioning of the rational 
system, Epstein and colleagues (1993) asked participants to respond to vignettes that 
described random unfortunate outcomes by writing the first three thoughts that came to 
mind (Epstein, 1993). For example, one vignette asked participants to put themselves in 
the place of a protagonist who had an accident when backing his automobile from a space 
in which his friend had asked him to park. Participants reported that their first emotion 
was one of anger: "It's his fault. Except for him, I wouldn't have had the accident." By 
their third thought, however, their thinking was more rational, accepting the 
responsibility as their own and reporting feelings of guilt as opposed to anger (Epstein, 
1993). Consistent with CEST, participants' initial, automatic thought was one of intense 
emotion associated with the functioning of the experiential system. Upon reflection, 
however, their thoughts were more consistent with the operation of the rational system, 
supporting the assumption that the experiential system is a rapid, automatic system that 
precedes the operation of the more reflective, deliberative rational system (Epstein, 
1993). 
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The ratio-bias phenomenon. The ratio-bias phenomenon, according to Epstein, 
serves as the most compelling evidence in support of the existence of two distinct modes 
ofprocessing. This phenomenon becomes evident in the presence of an experimental 
procedure designed to set the experiential and rational modes in conflict with each other 
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Epstein calls this test of the ratio-bias phenomenon the 
ratio-bias task. The ratio-bias (RB) phenomenon occurs when participants assess a lower 
probability event as being more likely than a higher probability event when the lower 
probability is presented as a ratio of larger numbers (Le., lOin 100) and the higher 
probability event is given in smaller numbers (e.g., 1 in 10) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
This phenomenon first became evident through a series of studies conducted by 
Miller, Turnbull, and McFarland (1989, as cited in Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). These 
studies showed that people judge the same probability of an unlikely event as lower when 
the probability is presented in the form of a ratio of smaller rather than of larger numbers. 
For example, results indicated that participants believed that a mother would be more 
suspicious that her child had cheated (by peeking) ifhe succeeded in drawing a desired 
chocolate chip cookie from a jar that contained 1 chocolate chip cookie of 20 cookies, 
than ifhe drew the desired cookie from a jar that contained 10 chocolate chip cookies of 
200 cookies (Miller et aI., 1989, as cited in Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). In other words, 
drawing the one desired cookie from a jar of twenty cookies was considered to be less 
likely, and therefore it aroused greater suspicion than drawing one of the 10 desired 
cookies in a jar containing 190 other cookies (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
According to Kirkpatrick & Epstein (1992), the ratio-bias effect can be explained 
by two principal attributes of the experiential system: the concretive principle and the 
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experiential learning principle. According to the concretive principle, people primarily 
encode information in the experiential system in the form of concrete representations 
(such as absolute numbers) as opposed to abstract representations (such as the relations 
between numbers). Thus, because absolute numbers are more concrete than ratios, 
people should generally be more influenced by absolute numbers. Moreover, ratios 
between large numbers often seem experientially less extreme than rations between small 
numbers. This is also attributed to the concretive principle; because large numbers of 
items are less pronounced in memory (i.e. are less concrete) than small numbers, "they 
are more likely to be perceived as closer to a ratio of equal quantities" (Kirkpatrick & 
Epstein, 1992). This follows partly from the fact that people can keep approximately 
seven pieces of information in their short-term memory. Therefore, people can more 
accurately represent one versus ten items in memory than ten versus one hundred items 
(Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
Furthermore, according to the experiential learning principle, the schemata that 
exist in the experiential system represent generalizations from emotionally significant 
experiences (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Consequently, through emotionally 
significant experiences in their lives, individuals are likely to have learned that any event 
with a l-in-20 or l-in-any-large-number is unlikely to occur. In other words, people have 
come to learn that the phrase "1 in x odds" is understood to mean ''unlikely.'' For this 
reason, CEST asserts that the subjective probability of a l-in-l0 outcome is smaller than 
a 1O-in-l 00 outcome. Thus, when combined, the concretive and experiential learning 
principles assert that "an unusual event with a given objective probability of occurrence 
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will have a higher subjective probability when it is represented by larger than by smaller 
absolute numbers" (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
Based on these principles, Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) hypothesized that the 
experiential system would be more responsive to absolute numbers than to ratios, 
whereas the rational system would exhibit the reverse pattern. To test this hypothesis, the 
Miller et al. (1989) paradigm was modified to make it a suitable for study in the 
laboratory as a real experience: Participants were given the opportunity to win money by 
drawing a red jelly bean from one of two bowls, a small bowl that contained 1 in 10 red 
jelly beans, and a large bowl that contained lOin 100 red jelly beans. Participants were 
told that in order to be able to select the bowl from which they wanted to draw, they 
would have to pay a dime for every trial; otherwise, the bowl from which they selected 
would be determined randomly. Although both bowls yielded a 10% of drawing a red 
jelly bean, participants tended to prefer the large bowl as compared to the small bowl 
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Moreover, a considerable proportion ofparticipants paid 
dimes in order to have the privilege of choosing the large bowl over the small one 
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). Participants acknowledged that they felt irrational and 
foolish in paying to draw from the larger bowl, but they felt that they had a better chance 
ofdrawing a red jelly bean when there were more of them (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
In a subsequent form of the study in which subjects were presented with a 
vignette of the jelly bean paradigm without the opportunity to win money, the majority of 
participants reported that they did not have a preference between the two bowls and 
would not pay extra money to be able to select the bowl from which they chose 
(Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). When asked to guess how others would respond, 
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however, participants reported that most people would prefer to draw from the larger 
bowl (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
The ratio-bias phenomenon has also been replicated in extreme versions of the 
ratio-bias paradigm in which the probabilities between the large and the small bowls are 
different. In two experiments (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994), participants preferred to 
choose from the large bowl that promised a 9% chance ofwinning as compared to the 
small bowl that promised a 10% chance ofwinning. A minority of participants (20%­
30%) even chose to draw from the large bowl even when they knew it offered a 5% 
chance ofwinning as compared to the small bowl which offered a 10% chance of 
winning (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). Among those who made nonoptimal choices, 
many acknowledged a conflict between emotion and reason and recognized that they had 
acted irrationally (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994). These results demonstrate the dominance 
of the experiential system over the rational system in a simple task in which the two 
systems were placed in conflict with each other. Under these circumstances, the majority 
ofparticipants found their intuitive (experiential) judgments to be more compelling, 
despite their explicit recognition that their behavior was irrational (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 
1994). 
Epstein cites the results obtained from the ratio-bias paradigms as support for a 
variety ofCEST assumptions. First, Epstein asserts that the conflict produced by the RB 
paradigm was due to a conflict between the rational and experiential systems. A majority 
of participants were initially attracted (in their experiential system) to the large bowl 
because it contained more winning beans and later recognized (in their rational system) 
that it made no difference from which bowl they chose. Despite this realization, the 
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decision invoked by the automatic, change-resistant experiential system dominated the 
participant's behavior in many cases. Second, the results of the ratio-bias paradigms 
support the Kirkpatrick and Epstein hypothesis (1992) that the experiential system is 
more responsive to concrete as compared to abstract representations. Third, the fact that 
participants expressed no preference to either tray when the opportunity to win money 
was revoked demonstrates that individuals have the need to appear rational; in the 
emotionally-stimulating trial, however, in which money was a factor, participants readily 
relied upon their experiential system. This supports the assertion that the experiential 
system is more heavily engaged in the presence of emotional stimuli (Kirkpatrick & 
Epstein, 1992). Moreover, results indicate that in order to demonstrate the ratio-bias 
phenomenon, it is necessary to "either bypass the rational system by using indirect 
techniques (such as having subjects estimate the behavior ofothers) or to strongly engage 
the experiential system by providing significant rewards" (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
Lastly, the extreme versions of the ratio-bias paradigm (Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994) 
illustrate that the experiential system can override the rational system even when 
individuals acknowledge their irrationality (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). 
Summary of CEST 
In summary, Epstein's CEST model asserts that all beings employ two distinct 
modes of information processing to make sense of the world. The experiential system is 
the evolutionarily older cognitive system and represents crude, lower brain functioning. 
It is experienced automatically, resistant to change, and driven by heuristics and the 
pleasure-pain principle. The rational system, on the other hand, is the evolutionarily new 
system and represents abstract, higher brain functioning. It is experienced intentionally, 
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changes more rapidly, and is driven by reason. A variety of research as well as everyday 
behaviors support the general distinction between two evolutionarily distinct cognitive 
systems. More specifically, however, a variety of studies conducted by Epstein and 
others (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Miller et aI., 1989; Epstein et aI., 1992; Epstein et 
aI., 1993; Epstein, 1994; Denes-Raj & Epstein, 1994) demonstrate that individuals 
engage in different types ofheuristic-based processing. These results support the 
distinction between a rational and experiential mode ofprocessing as proposed by CEST. 
In an attempt to fit disclosure into Epstein's CEST model, this study examined the 
cognitive and physiological processes that underlie written disclosure. To do so, 
however, it is necessary to examine prior research that examines the physiological effects 
of disclosure. 
Disclosure 
A variety of studies indicate that disclosure of traumatic events is associated with 
temporary increase in cardiovascular reactivity as well as long-term health benefits 
(Pennebaker, 1995). Many of the studies examining expression of emotions and health 
benefits utilize a writing paradigm developed by Pennebaker and associates, in which 
subjects are randomly assigned to write about emotional or control topics over a 4-day 
period for fifteen minutes a day in the laboratory (Pennebaker, 1995). Pennebaker and 
Beall (1986) used this paradigm to examine the physiological consequences ofwriting 
across four conditions: trauma-fact, trauma-emotion, trauma-combination, and control. 
The trauma-fact condition was asked to describe an upsetting personal experience in a 
narrative fashion, being careful to focus on the event itself and not on the feelings 
surrounding the event. The trauma-emotion condition was instructed to write specifically 
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about their feelings regarding a personally upsetting experience without mentioning what 
had actually happened. The trauma-combination condition was asked to describe the 
facts as well as the emotions surrounding a personally traumatic experience. The control 
condition was asked to write about a different trivial topic each evening (a description of 
their living room during the first session, the shoes they were wearing for the second 
session, and a tree and the room they were sitting in for the third and forth sessions, 
respectively). Health center records, physiological measures and self-reported moods and 
symptoms were collected during the study. 
Results indicated that writing about earlier traumatic experiences was associated 
with both short-term increases in physiological arousal (increased heart rate and blood 
pressure) and long-term decreases in health problems (as measured by the number of 
reported illnesses and the number ofvisits made to health services in the 6 months 
following the experiment). These effects were most pronounced among subjects who 
wrote about both the trauma and their emotions associated with the trauma. Of the 127 
trauma essays, 27% dealt with the death of a close friend, family member, or pet; 20% 
involved boyfriend/girlfriend problems; and 16% discussed fights among or with parents 
and friends. Other traumatic topics included major failure, public humiliation, car 
accidents and health problems. On the other hand, participants who wrote only about the 
facts surrounding a traumatic event without referring to their own emotions were similar 
to the control subjects on most physiological, health, and self-report measures. These 
two conditions reported more health problems in the 6 months following the experiment 
as compared to the trauma-emotion and trauma-combination participants. The results of 
this study provide further support for the idea that disclosure, particularly emotion-based 
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disclosure of traumatic events, is associated with short-term increases in physiological 
reactivity and long-term health benefits. 
Disclosure and long-term health benefits. That emotion-based disclosure is 
associated with improved long-term physiological outcomes is also supported by a 
variety ofother studies. For example, researchers have discovered that writing about 
traumatic experiences is linked to improved immune functioning, decreased numbers of 
physician visits for illness, and improved performance at school and work (e.g., Esterling, 
Antoni, Fletcher, Margulies, & Schneiderman, 1994, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995). 
Similarly, other studies indicate that failure to talk or acknowledge significant 
experiences is associated with increased health problems, autonomic activity, and 
ruminations (Pennebaker, 1995; Wegner, 1994, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995). 
For example, across several surveys, college students and adults who reported 
experiencing some type of traumatic event (e.g., sexual or physical abuse, death or 
divorce ofparents) were more likely to report current health problems ifthey had not 
disclosed the trauma to others than ifthey had shared it (Pennebaker & Hoover, 1986; 
Susman, 1986, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995). These results were obtained independent 
ofmeasures of social support (Pennebaker & Hoover, 1986). Similarly, a survey of 
spouses of suicide and accidental-death victims revealed that those individuals most 
likely to become ill in the year following the death were ones who had not confided in 
others about their experiences (Pennebaker & O'Heeron, 1984). 
Other researchers have also shown that inhibition, or a reduction in the ability to 
disclose stressful events, may be linked to an increased likelihood of illness. For 
example, the use of a repressive coping style has most frequently been associated with 
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the onset or progression of cancer (Gross, 1989). In addition, a number of investigations 
have found an association between repressive personality styles and poor natural killer 
cell (NKC) activity, the most readily measurable element of immune function with 
relevance to the control of tumors (Levy, Herberman, Maluish, Schlien, & Lippman, 
1985). 
Conversely, the expression of emotions in the laboratory, particularly negative 
emotions, has been associated with improved immune functioning, namely transient 
changes in blood lymphocyte reactivity to mitogens (Knapp et aI., 1992; Zakowski, 
McAllister, Deal, & Baum, 1992, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995) and with small elevations 
in natural killer cell (NKC) activity (Futterman, Kemeny, Shapiro, Polonsky, & Fahey, 
1992, as cited in Pennebaker, 1995). 
Disclosure and short-term physiological arousal. The finding by Pennebaker and 
others (Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker & O'Heeron, 1984; Pennebaker, 1995 
Petronio, 2000) that cardiovascular arousal increases during and immediately after 
emotion-based self-disclosure has also been validated in other studies. For example, a 
study that asked participants to verbally disclose an extremely stressful events that had 
happened in their lives indicated that those classified as high disclosers displayed 
increased systolic and diastolic blood pressure as well as increased heart rate during 
disclosing as compared to low disclosers (Pennebaker, Hughes, & O'Heeron, 1987). In 
addition, Cumes (1983) found that heart rate and blood pressure of participants increased 
when answering the question, "What makes you angry" as compared to "What did you do 
today" (as cited in Petronio, 2000). These findings contribute to the evidence that 
disclosure of emotional events results in temporary increases in cardiovascular reactivity. 
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Sympathetic versus parasympathetic control of the heart. While the 
studies described above rely upon increases in heart rate and blood pressure as evidence 
for increased cardiovascular reactivity during and following disclosure, these measures 
alone cannot indicate the activity of the two divisions of the autonomic system, the 
parasympathetic nervous system (PNS) and the sympathetic nervous system (SNS). 
Recent research indicates that these two divisions can co-vary reciprocally, 
independently, or nonreciprocally (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993). For example, 
an increase in heart rate may arise from a decrease in parasympathetic (vagal) control, an 
increase in sympathetic expenditure, or a co-activation ofboth autonomic divisions 
(Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1991; Quigley & Berntson, 1990, as cited in Berntson 
et aI., 1993). Moreover, studies have found that stimuli that invoke low brain 
functioning, such as cold pressor tasks, result in different patterns of cardiovascular 
reactivity than stimuli that invoke high brain functioning, such as mental arithmetic tasks 
(Tomaka, Blascovich, Kelsey & Leitten, 1993). These findings suggest that events 
involving high brain functioning involve one type of activation whereas lower brain 
functioning involves another. More specifically, when applying this proposition to 
Epstein's CEST model, it should follow that events primarily invoking the experiential 
system (lower brain functioning) should result in different patterns of sympathetic and 
vagal activity than those events primarily invoking the rational system (higher brain 
functioning). 
Respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) has been demonstrated to serve as an 
indicator ofvagal control of the heart (Berntson et aI., 1993). Berntson et al (1993) 
define RSA as a "rhythmical fluctuation in heart periods at the respiratory frequency that 
• 
Rational and Emotive Disclosure 24 
is characterized by a shortening and lengthening ofheart periods in a phase relationship 
with inspiration and expiration." In other words, RSA is an alteration in the rhythm of 
heartbeat in either time or force related to breathing. RSA has shown a high degree of 
sensitivity to psychological and behavioral variables, thus increasing its use as an 
indicator ofvagal control of the heart. For example, cognitive stressors such as mental 
arithmetic tasks have been shown to increase heart rate and decrease RSA (Berntson et 
aI., 1993). 
In contrast to RSA, pre-ejection period (PEP) has been demonstrated to serve as 
an indicator of sympathetic control of the heart (Sherwood, 1993). Few studies have 
examined PEP when investigating the relationship between cardiovascular reactivity and 
disclosure; instead, most studies have examined other factors, such as heart rate, stroke 
volume, cardiac output, and finger temperature (Richards & Gross, 1999). PEP is a 
measure of isovolumic contraction time, which is the time during which the left ventricle 
of the heart contracts before ejecting blood into the aorta (Sherwood, 1993). Thus, PEP' 
is a measure of contractility, or how hard the heart is beating. For this reason, an inverse 
relationship exists between contractility and PEP: As contractility increases, PEP 
becomes shorter and vice-versa (Sherwood, 1993). How hard the heart beats (as opposed 
to how fast) is a function solely of sympathetic nervous system activity. Therefore, in 
examining autonomic reactivity in this study, we used PEP and RSA as indicators of 
sympathetic and parasympathetic activation, respectively. 
Based on past research examining Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, disclosure, 
and physiological reactivity, I used Pennebaker & Beall's writing paradigm (1987) to 
examine whether emotional and rational disclosure respectively invoked experiential and 
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rational processes, respectively. I hypothesized that the trauma-fact and trauma-emotion 
writing conditions would invoke two different modes of processing: Participants 
disclosing the facts surrounding their trauma were expected to invoke their rational mode 
ofprocessing, while those disclosing the emotions surrounding their trauma were 
expected to invoke their experiential system. I tested this hypothesis by examining 
participants' behavioral outcomes (as measured by the decisions made in the RB 
paradigm) following the written disclosure task. Consequently, based on these 
hypotheses, I expected participants' performances in the decision-making task to be 
consistent with the writing condition to which they were assigned. Thus, if participants 
invoked their rational system through fact-based disclosure, they should have more 
frequently chosen from the smaller tray that yielded an equal or greater chance of success 
as compared to the larger tray. If, however, participants invoked their experiential system 
through the emotion-based disclosure, they should have more frequently chosen from the 
larger tray that yielded a lower chance of winning. No hypotheses were made for the 
trauma-combination condition, in which participants wrote about the facts and emotions 
surrounding a traumatic experience. Given that this was a combination condition, it was 
included for comparison purposes to the conditions with one of each only. Additionally, 
no behavioral hypotheses were made for the control condition, in which participants 
described their campus bedroom. This also served as a control condition for writing. 
I also hypothesized that the trauma-fact and trauma-emotion disclosure conditions 
would result in differences in autonomic space. To examine the physiological outcomes 
of disclosure, heart rate (HR), blood pressure (BP), pre-ejection period (PEP), and 
respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) were recorded throughout the writing and decision­
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making tasks as indicators of sympathetic and vagal activity. First, consistent with the 
literature that associated emotional disclosure with increased cardiovascular reactivity 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1986; Pennebaker, 1995; Petronio, 2000), those in the trauma­
emotion condition (i.e. experiential mode) were expected to display overall increases in 
physiological arousal as compared to those in the trauma-fact and control conditions. 
Second, based on the assertion that events involving high versus low brain functioning 
involve different types of activation, I expected to see different patterns of autonomic 
arousal between the two writing groups. I posited that those in the trauma-emotion 
condition (i.e. experiential mode) would display autonomic patterns associated with 
lower brain functioning, marked by an increase in sympathetic activity coupled with a 
decrease in vagal activity. Conversely, I hypothesized that those in the trauma-fact 
condition (Le. rational mode) would display autonomic patterns associated with higher 
brain functioning, marked by diverse sympathetic and vagal activity. Such patterns 
included an increase in sympathetic activity with no change in vagal activity and a 
decrease in vagal activity with no change in sympathetic activity. The existence of such 
patterns of autonomic reactivity between writing conditions would support the claim that 
emotional and rational disclosure invoked the experiential and rational systems, 
respectively. 
Method 
Participants 
Sixty undergraduates were recruited as participants from an Introductory 
Psychology course at Illinois Wesleyan University, a small, private, liberal arts 
institution. Ofthese, 24 were male and 36 were female. Ages of the participants ranged 
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from eighteen to twenty-two. Each received one research credit toward their general 
psychology course requirements for participating. 
Measures 
Ratio-bias paradigm. Participants were presented with two rectangular, 
transparent, plastic trays containing different mixtures of red and white jelly beans. The 
large and a small trays were always presented together. The small tray contained a total 
of 10 jelly beans, 1 ofwhich was red (10% red). The large tray contained a total of 100 
jellybeans, with the number of red jelly beans varying among trials from 7, 9, and 10, 
(7%, 9%, and 10% red). The jellybeans were spread in a flat layer so that all were 
visible. An index card stating the percentage of red jelly beans and the number ofred and 
white jelly beans was placed in front of each tray for each trial. 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). This 40-item inventory (Epstein, 1999) 
was designed to measure rational and experiential thinking styles. Items on the scale 
included questions such as, "I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about' 
something," and "I like to rely on my intuitive impressions." Participants responded to 
statements on a 5-point scale ranging from "Definitely false" to "Definitely true." As 
individual differences may have been related to this construct, I included this measure as 
a potential co-variate (see Appendix A for REI and REI scoring key). 
Letter-circling task. Participants engaged in a letter-circling reaction time task 
during which their cardiovascular measures, performance, and reaction time were 
recorded. The objective of this task was to control for the confound of arousal. For 
example, differences in arousal would predict impaired performance on complex tasks, 
such as the ratio-bias task, and improved performance on simple tasks, such as the letter­
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circling task (Zajonc, 1965). Participants were given a page of text and asked to circle 
every letter "e" as quickly and accurately as possible (see Appendix B). Participants 
were told that they would be timed, and their reaction time was recorded with a 
stopwatch. This task emulated computer-based tasks that have repeatedly been used to 
examine reaction time in response to simple stimuli. Uniformity of task performance 
between participants during this task would suggest that any performance differences in 
the ratio-bias task across the four writing conditions could not be accounted for by 
arousal differences. 
Physiological. ZCG, a non-invasive measure ofblood flow through the heart, and 
ECG, a measure of the electromechanical action of the heart, was obtained using a 
Minnesota Impedance Cardiograph (model304B) employing the standard tetrapolar 
aluminum/mylar tape electrode system. The electrodes were adhesive bands that 
completely encircled the body. The second band was placed at the base of the neck; the 
first band was placed at least 3 em above the second band; the third band was placed at 
the level of the xiphisternal junction (or just below the bra line for female participants); 
the fourth band was placed at least 3 cm below the third band. The front and back 
distances between the inner edges of the second and third bands were recorded for use in 
data reduction. The impedance signals ofprimary interest were Zo, a measure of basal 
thoracic impedance, and dZ/dt, a measure of changes in thoracic impedance. ECG was 
recorded using the standard lead II configuration with Ag/AgCI disposable electrodes 
(Protrace 9113). Blood pressure, a measure ofpressure within the arteries, was obtained 
using a get from lab Monitor (model BP-508). Blood pressure was obtained from a self­
inflating cuff. 
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Procedure 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants were infonned of the general nature 
of the study and completed an infonned consent fonn (see Appendix C). Participants 
were then seated in the recording chamber, and a blood pressure cuff and various 
sensors/transducers were attached. Participants rested for up to one minute while the 
physiological signals were checked and calibrated. Then, the first five-minute baseline 
recording was obtained. The experimenter left the room during the baseline recording to 
allow the participant to relax (see Appendix D for log sheet used to record pulse and 
blood pressure). 
After the 5-minute baseline recording, the experimenter returned to the recording 
room. Participants were then given paper and a pencil and introduced to one of four 
writing topics: trauma-fact, trauma-emotion, trauma-combination, and control (see 
Appendix E, F, G & H for respective writing instructions). All sixty participants were 
randomly and equally assigned to one of the four writing conditions, N=15. The 
experimenter left the room again during the writing task to give the participant privacy. 
The participants randomly assigned to the trauma-fact condition were told to discuss a 
personally traumatic experience from a strictly factual perspective, (i.e. discuss when, 
where, and what happened), without referring to their emotions at all. Those assigned to 
the trauma-emotion writing condition were asked to focus on how they felt at the time of 
the trauma and how they felt now, omitting any discussion of the facts surrounding the 
experience. Those assigned to the trauma-combination condition were asked to write 
about the facts and emotions surrounding a personally traumatic experience, focusing on 
what happened, how they felt then, and how they felt about it now. The control condition 
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was asked to write about their campus bedroom in detail, describing the furniture, colors, 
and pictures in their room. Physiological reactivity was measured during the task. 
After ten minutes ofwriting, the experimenter returned, and participants were 
introduced to the ratio-bias task and the letter-circling task in counterbalanced order. 
During the ratio-bias task, participants were told that they had the opportunity to win 
money by drawing a red jelly bean from one of the trays (see Appendix I for 
instructions). The net amount that could be won ($9) was placed on the table in full view 
in play money, and this play money was exchanged for real money at the end of the 
study. Participants were told that they could win $1 upon drawing a red jelly and would 
neither win nor lose money upon drawing a white jellybean. Participants were given the 
opportunity to select which tray they would draw for each trial. 
The ratio-bias task consisted ofnine trials. The first six trials varied by 
percentage of red jelly beans in the large tray (7%, 9%, 10%). A Latin-square design was 
used to vary the order of the trials. The last three trials were trials in which the large tray 
contained either 40% or 50% red jelly beans, and the small tray contained either 50% or 
40% red jelly beans, respectively. These trials were not included in the statistical 
analyses and were included solely to increase the likelihood that all participants would 
win some money. 
For each trial, the experimenter presented the two labeled trays ofjelly beans and 
read a script explaining the valence of each tray. The participant was then asked to 
indicate the tray from which he or she wanted to draw (see Appendix J for RB recording 
logs). Tray positions were altered on every trial to control for a position effect (i.e., right 
or left). After the participant chose a tray, the experimenter placed a blindfold on the 
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participant's eyes, mixed the jelly beans, and guided the participant's hand toward the 
selected tray. Depending on the outcome of each trial, the participant was either paid 
(won by drawing a red jelly bean) or had nothing happen (drew a white jelly bean). 
Autonomic reactivity was measured throughout the entire task. Upon completion of the 
ratio-bias task and the letter-circling task, the recording apparatus was removed, and the 
participant completed the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) and a demographics 
form (see Appendix K for demographics form). Upon completion of the self-report 
measures, participants underwent a verbal emotional assessment. An emotional 
assessment was completed as part of the debriefing process to ensure that the participant 
was not adversely affected as a result of the written disclosure (see Appendix L). If the 
participant was emotionally stable, he/she was thanked and debriefed (see Appendix M). 
The entire procedure took approximately 1 hour. 
Results 
Manipulation check 
In order to examine whether effects were consistent with prior literature, 
manipulation checks were included. First we examined whether heart rate (HR) and 
mean arterial pressure (MAP) increased from the rest period to the writing period in a 
way consistent with past research (Pennebaker & Beall, 1987; Pennebaker et aI., 1987). A 
within-subjects analysis ofvariance (ANOVA) tests indicated main effects, marked by 
significant increases in heart rate, E(2, 53)=55.3, p < .05, and mean arterial pressure, E 
(2,53)= 16.4, p < .05, from the last minute of rest to the first minute of writing. (Refer to 
Table 2 for mean values). We did not find significant differences, however, in heart rate, 
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E (6, 108)=.26,12> .1, and mean arterial pressure, E (6, 108)=.11,12 >.1, by writing 
condition. 
Manipulation checks also examined I) whether decisions made in the ratio-bias 
(RB) task mirrored past trends, and 2) whether participants' scores on the Rational­
Experiential Inventory (REI) predicted choices made in the ratio-bias (RB) task as found 
previously. In examining the average number of optimal and nonoptimal choices made in 
the RB task, our results replicated prior findings (Pacini & Epstein, 1999): Overall, 
participants made more optimal (M=2.6, SD=l.I) as compared to nonoptimal (M=1.3, 
SD=1.1) choices across the 6 RB trials, but did make nonoptimal choices. (Recall that 
there were a total of 9 RB trials, yet the last 3 trials in which the valences of the small and 
large tray varied between 50% and 40% were included only to increase the chances that 
participants would win money; these 3 trials were not included in our statistical analyses. 
Additionally, recall that for two of the six trials, valences in the two trays were equal, and 
hence the decisions made did not reflect an optimal versus nonoptimal decision). 
To examine the relationship between participants' scores on the REI and choices 
made in the RB task, we conducted a median split to separate those classified as high vs. 
low experiential/rational thinkers. Those participants with median scores were 
eliminated from the sample, yielding N=46 scores remaining. A univariate ANOVA 
indicated that optimal choices made by those low in total rationality (M=2.85, SD=I.2) 
were not significantly different from those high in rationality (M=2.6, SD=I.l), F=.24, P 
> .1. In addition, a univariate ANOVA revealed that those low in total experientiality 
made optimal choices (M=2.7, SD=1.1) that were not significantly different from those 
high in total experientiality, (M=2.8, SD=1.2), E=.04, 12 > .1. Thus, there were no 
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significant differences in the number of optimal choices made between those classified as 
high versus low experiential or rational thinkers1. These results are inconsistent with past 
research (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) that found a direct relationship between total 
rationality scores on the REI and the number of optimal choices made on the RB 
paradigm. 
Finally, one potential confound in our study was participants' level of arousal. As 
discussed above, differences in arousal would predict impaired performance on complex 
tasks, such as the RB task, and improved performance on simple tasks, such as the letter-
circling task (Zajonc, 1965). Thus, to control for this confound, we included a simple 
reaction-time task in which participants' circled every letter "e" they found in a 
paragraph of text. Participants' reaction time and performance on this letter-circling task 
were measured and analyzed as an indicator of whether any physiological arousal from 
the writing task might have also influenced decisions made in the RB task. To check for 
differences in the effects of arousal by writing condition, one-way analyses of variance 
were used to compare participants' accuracy and reaction time in performing the letter-
circling task across the four writing conditions. Results indicated no significant 
differences in the reaction time, E(3,56)=1.3, Q> .1, number ofmissed E's, E(3,56)=.01, 
Q> .1, or the number ofnon-E's circled, E(3,56)=.56, Q> .1, by writing condition. 
Because the letter-circling task was counterbalanced with the ratio-bias task throughout 
the study, we also examined reaction time and performance on the letter-circling task for 
those participants who participated in the letter circling task immediately after writing (as 
opposed to immediately following the RB task). This manipulation was included to 
IWhen including the median scores in the high experiential/rational groups, the effects were the same. Mean number of 
optimal choices = 2.8 (SD=I.22) & 2.7 (SD=1.15) for those who scored high and low in rationality, respectively. 
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account for the possibility of the declining arousal effects of disclosure for those who 
participated in the circling task immediately after disclosure. Again, results indicated no 
difference in reaction time, E(3,26)=2.66, Q> .1, number ofmissed E's, E(3,26)=1.73, Q 
> .1, and number ofnon-E's circled, E(3,26)=.06, Q> .1, by writing condition. These 
results suggest that any performance differences in the RB task across the four writing 
conditions were not accounted for by arousal differences. 
Effects of writing conditions on the ratio-bias task 
We first ran a frequency check to examine outliers; no outliers were found. The 
mean number of optimal choices among each writing condition was the following: 
trauma-fact M=2.4 (SD=1.2), trauma-emotion M=2.4 (SD=1.1), trauma-combination 
M=2.6 (SD=I.2), control M=2.9 (SD=I.0). A one-way ANOVA found that these 
differences were not significant, E(3,56)=.528, Q>.1. Because the order ofthe RB and 
letter-circling task was counterbalanced throughout the study, we next filtered the data to 
examine only those participants who participated in the RB task immediately following· 
the writing task. A one-way ANOVA found no significant differences between the four 
groups in this condition, E(3,26)=1.09, Q>.1. 
As a follow-up, we examined contrasts comparing the number ofoptimal 
decisions for each ofthe 3 trauma conditions (trauma-fact, trauma-emotion, and trauma­
combination) to the 1 non-trauma (control) condition for all 6 trials of the RB task. A 
Student's T-test indicated no significant differences between the trauma-fact and control 
group, trauma-emotion and control group, or trauma-combination and control group, Q> 
.1 in all cases. Next we examined the effect ofwriting on just the first trial of the RB 
task. A Pearson chi-square test indicated significant differences in the frequency of types 
•
 
Rational and Emotive Disclosure 35 
of choices made across the different writing conditions in trial 1 ofthe RB paradigm, x2 
(3, N=60}=14.4, Q < .05. More specifically, participants in the control condition made 
the most optimal choices in trial 1 of the RB paradigm (11 optimal choices compared to 1 
nonoptimal choice), followed by the trauma-combination condition (6 optimal choices 
compared to 1 nonoptimal choice), the trauma-emotion condition (5 optimal choices 
compared to 6 nonoptimal choices) and the trauma-fact condition (4 optimal choices 
compared to 6 nonoptimal choices). (Refer to Table 3 for mean scores). Inspection of 
these frequencies revealed 91 % and 85% optimal choices made by the control and 
trauma-combination conditions (respectively) in trial I, as compared to 41 %, and 40% 
optimal choices made by the trauma-emotion and trauma-fact conditions, respectively. 
Thus, these results suggest that those in the trauma-combination and control conditions 
may have been processing in the rational mode, whereas those in the trauma-emotion and 
trauma-fact conditions may have been processing in the experiential mode. Given that 
the effects were not significant across all 6 trials, these results also suggest that the 
cognitive effects of the writing task may be short-lived. 
The above analyses, however, did not filter the equal optimality trials (trials in 
which the probability of drawing a red jelly bean was equal in the two trays) from the 
optimal and nonoptimal trials. Therefore, as a follow-up analysis to ensure that the 
overall effect was not somehow due to the equal valence trials, we repeated the chi­
square test after filtering out any trials in which the trays contained equal percentages of 
red jelly beans. Again, results indicated significant differences in the frequencies of 
types of choices made by participants in different writing conditions in trial 1 of the RB 
task, x2 (3, N = 40) = 9.6, Q < .05. These significant differences were also replicated 
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when examining the number ofoptimal choices on trial 1 of the RB task only for those 
who participated in the RB task immediately after writing, x2 (6, N=30) = 10.5, II < .05. 
Effects of writing condition on autonomic activation 
As discussed above, autonomic space is measured by respiratory sinus arrhythmia 
(RSA) and pre-ejection period (PEP). RSA is an indication ofparasympathetic activity; 
as RSA increases, parasympathetic control of the heart increases. PEP is an indication of 
sympathetic activity; as PEP decreases, sympathetic control of the heart increases. 
Correlational analyses were conducted to examine the effects ofwriting condition on 
autonomic activation. Specifically, we examined the correlation between the change in 
RSA and the change in PEP from the last minute of the rest period to the first minute of 
writing. The greater the correlation between these two variables, the greater the coupling 
ofthe sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic nervous system. (For 
all tests with rejection criteria set at II < .05, only the correlation for the trauma­
combination condition was significant). (Refer to Figures 1-4 for scatter graphs 
indicating degree of sympathetic and parasympathetic coupling by writing condition). 
Inspection of autonomic coupling revealed a relatively small correlation between 
the change in RSA and the change in PEP during the first minute ofwriting for those in 
the trauma-fact condition, r=.28, n.s. This indicated relatively weak coupling ofthe 
sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic system for those in this 
writing condition. Those in the trauma-emotion writing condition, however, 
demonstrated a relatively strong positive correlation between the change in RSA and PEP 
from the last minute of rest to the first minute of writing, r=.50, II < .05. Combined, 
these findings lend partial support for our hypotheses. They suggest more coupling of the 
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autonomic system during the first minute ofwriting for those in the trauma-emotion 
condition ([=.50) as compared to the trauma-fact condition ([=.28). The degree of 
coupling between the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions was weak: in the first 
minute of writing for those in the trauma-combination group, [=.05, n.s. Moreover, 
similar to the trauma-fact and trauma-combination conditions, coupling of the 
sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions was also weak: in the control condition, [=.18, 
n.s. Again, these results indicate less coupling of the autonomic nervous system in the 
first minute ofwriting for the control condition ([=.18) as compared to the trauma­
emotion condition ([=.50). 
Discussion 
The results of this experiment should be viewed as promising rather than 
definitive. Results replicated past findings demonstrating increases in heart rate and 
mean arterial pressure during disclosure. Results were inconsistent, however, with past 
studies that suggested a relationship between scores on the REI and performance in the 
RB task. Across the four writing conditions, we found limited differences in 
physiological reactivity (as measured by autonomic activation) and behavioral outcomes 
(as measured by choices made in the ratio-bias paradigm). This suggests that if the 
writing tasks evoked differential thinking, the effect was small. Consistent with our 
hypotheses, participants in the trauma-emotion condition displayed significantly greater 
coupling of the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the autonomic system as 
compared to the other writing conditions. Thus, to the extent that differences in 
autonomic coupling reflect control of different parts of the brain, writing about the 
emotions surrounding a traumatic event may indeed have primed a different mode of 
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cognitive processing than the other tasks. The results of the RB task did not confirm our 
hypotheses that participants in the trauma-emotion condition would make fewer optimal 
choices than those in the trauma-fact condition. Instead, differences by writing condition 
in the RB choices were evident only during trial I of the RB task, with those in the 
control condition along with those in the trauma-combination condition making 
proportionally more optimal choices relative to those in the trauma-emotion and trauma­
fact groups. The results of all the RB trials combined did not indicate significant 
differences by writing condition. 
While the pattern displayed in the RB paradigm did not support our hypotheses, 
these findings nonetheless hold important implications in understanding the cognitive 
effects ofwritten disclosure. That is, the trauma writing condition that resulted in the 
most optimal choices in the RB task was the condition that integrated both rational and 
emotional disclosure (trauma-combination group). These results highlight the possible 
importance of cognitive integration in predicting rationality. One can speculate that this . 
means that combined emotional and factual disclosure as compared to just emotional or 
factual disclosure allows one (at least in the short-run) to place the traumatic event in the 
most rational light. Moreover, recall that the rational system encodes information in the 
form of abstract representations (as opposed to concrete representations). Thus, these 
results suggest that thinking about both the facts and emotions surrounding personal 
trauma may result in more abstract thinking about the event, leading to the highest level 
of rational thinking. Thus, the increased proportion of optimal choices displayed by 
those in the trauma-combination condition in trial I (as compared to the trauma-fact and 
trauma-emotion conditions) may be due to the abstract thinking or to the cognitive 
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integration of the rational and experiential modes that occurred during disclosure. 
Moreover, that differences across the writing conditions were only evident in trial 1 of 
the RB task may suggest that the effects ofdisclosure were short-lived. In other words, 
the mode of thinking that was conjured through written disclosure may have lasted just 
long enough to influence the first trial of the RB task. After the first trial, participants 
may have become engrossed in the game, thus overriding any cognitive effects that the 
writing task may have conjured. How long these effects were maintained during the 
writing task is open to future research. 
Although potentially revealing, the results must be tentatively interpreted. First, 
the total number ofparticipants in the study (N=60) and the total number ofparticipants 
in each writing condition (N=15) were relatively small compared to prior RB studies. 
Furthermore, participants were not selected in any way for having a debilitating 
undisclosed trauma; therefore, it was impossible to evaluate whether or not participants 
were able to write about the given topic. Additionally, participants' writings had not yet 
been coded at the time ofthe analyses. Therefore, we were unaware ofthe participants' 
levels ofdisclosure (i.e., high or low) and whether they had disclosed according to the 
directions given (i.e. disclosing solely the facts or emotions surrounding a traumatic 
event). Consequently, if participants did not write according to the directions given, the 
possibility of evoking a particular mode of thinking would not be possible. Lastly, lack 
oftime limited the extent and depth ofour analyses. It is possible that more trends may 
appear in the physiological and ratio-bias data after further analyses. 
Our results hold a great deal ofpromise for future research. As demonstrated in 
earlier studies (Pennebaker, 1995; Pennebaker & Beall, 1987), our results replicate the 
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finding that written disclosure evokes cardiovascular reactivity. Moreover, our results 
hold future promise for revising the ratio-bias task in attempts to prevent the diminishing 
effect ofwriting past the first trial. To do this, we may substitute a pair-wise preference 
task in place of the RB task, in which pictures ofthe small and large jelly bean trays 
flash on a computer screen for 2.5 seconds for 45 trials, thereby allowing us to examine 
more trials of the RB task during a shorter period oftime. Participants will have 2.5 
seconds to select a tray, thus causing quicker judgments and increased potential for 
variability (by increasing the number of trials in the task from 6 to 45). These changes 
may prevent the participant's ability to "regroup," as may have happened in this study, 
and may allow them to remain in the cognitive mode evoked by the writing task. Future 
endeavors should also examine gender differences in the RB task. Moreover, a close 
examination of CEST is suggested, as some skepticism has been cast on the idea that the 
rational system is an evolutionarily newer system that dates back only 5,000 years. 
These modifications will yield more comprehensive findings relating to the 
effects ofwritten disclosure upon behavioral outcomes. The ultimate resolution of these 
issues should have direct bearing on our understanding of the cognitive and physiological 
underpinnings ofwritten disclosure. In sum, the results reveal tentative support for the 
idea that different types ofwritten disclosure may invoke different cognitive and 
physiological processes. 
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Table I
 
A Comparison of the Experiential and Rational Systems (Epstein, 1994; Epstein, 1998)
 
Experiential Rational 
1. Holistic 1. Analytic 
2. Automatic, effortless 2. Intentional, effortful 
3. Affective: pleasure-pain oriented (what 
feels good) 
3. Logical: Reason oriented (what is 
sensible) 
4. Associationistic connections 4. Logical connections 
5. Behavior mediated by ''vibes'' from past 
events 
5. Behavior mediated by conscious 
appraisal of events 
6. Encodes reality in concrete images, 
metaphors, and narratives 
6. Encodes reality in abstract symbols, 
words, and numbers 
7. More rapid processing: oriented toward 
immediate action 
7. Slower processing: capacity for long-
delayed action 
8. Slower and more resistant to change 8. Changes more rapidly and easily 
9. More crudely differentiated 9. More highly differentiated 
10. More crudely integrated-dissociative, 
emotional complexes; context-specific 
processing 
10. More highly integrated; context-
general principles 
11. Experienced passively and 
preconsciously; we believe we are seized 
by our emotions 
11. Experienced actively and consciously; 
we believe we are in control of our 
conscious thoughts 
12. Self-evidently valid: "Experiencing is 
believing" 
12. Requires justification via logic and 
evidence 
• 
Rational and Emotive Disclosure 42 
Table 2 
Mean Heart Rate (HR) and Mean Arterial Pressure (MAP) During Last Minute of Rest 
and First Minute of Writing Across the Four Writing Conditions 
Writing Condition 
Physiological Trauma-fact Trauma-emotion Trauma-combination Control 
Reactivity 
HR-rest 74.6 (SD=10.6) 71.1 (SD=12.4) 70.5 (SD=II.4) 73.7 (SD=9.7) 
HR-writing 79.3 (SD=12.6) 78.4 (SD=13.9) 78.1 (SD=12.2) 80.2 (SD=9.7) 
MAP-rest 87.0 (SD=7.5) 85.4 (SD=8.1) 87.3 (SD=10.8) 86.3 (SD=6.9) 
MAP-writing. 90.1 (SD=9.6) 92.7 (SD=II.4) 91.9 (SD=8.9) 89.6 (SD=7.1) 
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Table 3 
Number of Optimal and Nonoptimal Choices Made in Trial 1 ofthe Ratio-Bias Task by 
Writing Condition 
Choice in trial 1 
Writing Condition Optimal Nonoptimal 
Trauma-fact 4 (6.5) 6 (3.5) 
Trauma-emotion 5 (7.2) 6 (3.9) 
Trauma-combination 6 (4.6) 1 (2.4) 
Control 11 (7.8) 1 (4.2) 
Note. The values in parentheses represent the expected values. 
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Appendix A 
REI Participant #__ 
Please circle the corresponding number as you rate the following statements about your feelings, 
beliefs, and behaviors. Work rapidly; fIrst impressions are as good as any. 
, 
1 
Definitely 
False 
2 
Mostly 
False 
3 
Undecided 
or Equally 
True and 
False 
4 
Mostly 
True 
5 
Definitely 
True 
1. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make 
mistakes. 1 2 3 4 5 
3. I prefer complex to simple problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me 
make decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 
5. I have no problem in thinking things through clearly. 1 2 3 4 5 
6. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on 
my gut feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 
7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. I am not a very analytical thinker. 1 2 3 4 5 
10. I believe in trusting my hunches. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 1 2 3 4 5 
12. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based 
on feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 
13. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they 
are accurate. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my 
decisions. 1 2 3 
4 5 
15. Knowing the answer without having to understand the 
reasoning behind it is good enough for me. 1 2 3 4 
5 
16. I would not want to depend on anyone who described 
himself or herself as intuitive. 
1 2 3 4 5 
17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out 
problems in my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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18. I enjoy intellectual challenges. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, 
even if I can't explain how I know. 1 2 3 4 5 
20. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course 
of action. 1 2 3 4 5 
21. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most 
people's. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. Reasoning things out carefully is not one of my strong 
points~ 1 2 3 4 5 
23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on 
intuition. 1 2 3 4 5 
124. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth 
. about something. 1 2 3 4 5 
25. I trust my initial feelings about people. 1 2 3 4 5 
26. I have a logical mind. 1 2 3 4 5 
27. I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition 
for important decisions. 1 2 3 4 5 
28. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. 1 2 3 4 5 
29. I don't have a very good sense of intuition. 1 2 3 4 5 
30. I am not very good in solving problems that require 
careful logical analysis. 1 2 3 4 5 
31. I think there are times wheft one should rely on one's 
intuition. 1 2 3 4 5 
32. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms. 1 2 3 4 5 
33. Using my "gut feelings" usually works well for me in 
figuring out problems in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 
34. I don't reason well under pressure. 1 2 3 4 5 
35. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions. 1 2 3 4 5 
36. Thinking hard and for a long time about something 
gives me little satisfaction. 1 2 3 4 5 
37. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest 
"gut feelings" to fmd an answer. 1 2 3 4 5 
38. I am much better at figuring things out logically than 
most people. 1 2 3 4 5 
39. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems. 1 2 3 4 5 
140. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing 1 2 3 4 5 to me. 
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Note. From "The Relation of Rational and Expenentlal Information Processing Styles to Personality, Basic Beliefs, 
and the Ratio-Bias Phenomenon," by Rosemary Pacini and Seymour Epstein, 1999, Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 76, p. 976. Copyright 1999 by the American Psychological Association. Adapted with permission. 
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REI Scoring Key 
Scoring: Sum ofratings (1-5) of items in a scale. Item numbers with an ''T'' are reverse scored as 
follows: 1 = 5, 2 = 4, 3 = 3, 4 = 2, 5 = 1. 
Rational Ability 
1. I'm not that good at figuring out complicated problems. 
5. I have no problem in thinking things through clearly. 
r9. I am not a very analytical thinker. 
14. I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
17. Using logic usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life. 
r22. Reasoning things out carefully is not one ofmy strong points. 
26. I have a logical mind. 
30. I am not very good in solving problems that require careful logical analysis. 
r34. I don't reason well under pressure. 
38. I am much better at figuring things out logically than most people. 
Rational Favorability 
3. I prefer complex to simple problems. 
r7. Thinking is not my idea of an enjoyable activity. 
11. I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
rl5. Knowing the answer without having to understand the reasoning behind it is good enough 
forme. 
18. I enjoy intellectual challenges.
 
r24. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.
 
r28. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking.
 
32. I enjoy thinking in abstract terms.
 
r36. Thinking hard anq for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction.
 
40. Learning new ways to think would be very appealing to me. 
Total Rationality = Sum of Rational Ability & Rational Engagement 
Experiential Ability
 
r2. If I were to rely on my gut feelings, I would often make mistakes.
 
6. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings.
 
10. I believe in trusting my hunches.
 
rl3. I suspect my hunches are inaccurate as often as they are accurate.
 
19. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if! can't explain how I know.
 
r2I. My snap judgments are probably not as good as most people's.
 
25. I trust my initial feelings about people.
 
r29. I don't have a very good sense of intuition.
 
33. Using my gut feelings usually works well for me in figuring out problems in my life.
 
37. I hardly ever go wrong when I listen to my deepest gut feelings to find an answer.
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Experiential Favorability
 
r4. I generally don't depend on my feelings to help me make decisions.
 
8. I like to rely on my intuitive impressions.
 
r12. I think it is foolish to make important decisions based on feelings.
 
r16. I would not want to depend on anyone who described himself or herself as intuitive.
 
20. I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action.
 
r23. I don't like situations in which I have to rely on intuition.
 
r27. I don't think it is a good idea to rely on one's intuition for important decisions.
 
31. I think there are times when one should rely on one's intuition.
 
35. I tend to use my heart as a guide for my actions.
 
39. Intuition can be a very useful way to solve problems.
 
Total Experientiality = Sum Experiential Ability & Experiential Engagement 
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Appendix B 
Participant #__ 
Wine cork takes the fonn of a suberose tissue, composed of 
an arrangement of parenchymatous cells originating from a 
secondary meristem: phellogen. All trees produce cells of the cork 
type, but it is only the Quercus Suber that produces a protective 
layer that achieves considerable thickness (which is harvested and 
regenerates) with characteristics that make it commercially 
profitable. Not only does the cork oak bear the distinction of 
producing suberose tissues, it is also, due to its long lifespan (150 
to 200 years), certainly the only tree to show a conspicuous 
production of~suberin, with an excellent capacity for regeneration 
and a protective tissue characterized by extraordinary physio­
mechanical and chemical properties. 
----
----
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Appendix C 
Informed Consent 
Weare requesting that you participate in a research study being conducted by Leila 
Setork, an undergraduate psychology student here at lllinois Wesleyan University under the 
supervision of Dr. John Ernst. At the end of this fonn you will be asked to initial two paragraphs 
to ensure that you have carefully read them. The purpose of this project is to better understand 
the cognitive and physiological processes underlying written disclosure. In order to do this, we 
are fIrst going to ask you to write about a personal event for ten minutes. You may be asked to 
write about something traumatic or something not traumatic. While you write, you will be 
hooked up to sensors and a blood pressure cuff. This equipment will be used to collect your 
physiological responses (such as heart rate, blood pressure, etc.) throughout the study. 
In order to measure your heart function, two adhesive bands, like long Band-Aids, will be 
placed around your neck and two around your abdomen. This will require that you raise your 
shirt slightly so we can place the lower bands around your stomach. These bands will be placed 
on you by a female research assistant. In addition, a very few individuals report that the bands 
leave a slight reddening of the skin. Although this causes no discomfort, the marks sometimes 
take up to 24 hours to completely fade. 
initials 
You may then be asked to write about a personally traumatic experience for ten minutes. 
initials
Afterwards,.you will be asked to participate in a decision-making task and a visual 
performance task. Lastly, you will be completing a total of four surveys and a brief 
demographics questionnaire (questions about your age, year in school, etc.), which will take 
approximately 15 minutes. The questions we ask you are about your beliefs and thinking styles. 
You may fInd some of the questions to be personal or they may ask you about feelings that you 
are not comfortable with. You are free to withdraw from the session at any time and are free to 
answer or to not answer any of the questions. There will be no penalty or loss of credit for 
withdrawing or for omission of answers. The entire procedure will last about an hour. 
The specifIc information that you provide will be strictly confidential. Your 
questionnaires and writing samples will be identified by a random numbered code, and your name 
will not appear on any of the materials. Your responses will be classifIed and stored by a 
participant ill number only. All information will be held under lock and key. Your writing 
samples may be viewed only by members of the research team, and your identity will remain 
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anonymous at all times. Under no circumstances will your writing sample or your responses to 
the questionnaires be matched with your name. The anonymous responses that you provide will 
be used by the members of the research team to better understand the people's experiences. 
Summaries of information you and others participating in the study provide may appear in 
research publications about psychology. 
If you have any questions regarding this project, please feel free to contact Leila Setork at 
(309) 556-3213 or the supervising faculty member, Dr. John M. Ernst at (309) 556- 3907. If you 
have any concerns regarding this project, please feel free to contact Dr. Catherine Scherck, a 
member of IWU's independent review board for ethics in experimentation, at (309) 556-3271. 
I have read the above information pertaining to the cognitive and physiological processes
 
underlying disclosure.
 
__ I agree to participate in this research. I understand that I may stop participation at any time
 
or to not answer any of the questions without penalty.
 
I do not agree to participate in this research. 
Participant Name (print) 
Participant Signature Date 
.) 
Interviewer Signature Date 
'-----­
------ ------ -----
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Appendix D 
Participant Log 
Participant ID# Date Time 
Participant Gender _ 
Experimenter _ 
Writing Condition. _ 
Task order: 1) 2) 
Measurements (between tape 2 and 3): Front cm Back Cffi 
BP Readings: Push "start" at the time indicated in the parentheses. 
Rest task (Block 1): 
Reading 1 (30 sec.)
 
Reading 2 (2 1/2 min.)__
 
Reading 3 (4 min.)
 
Writing (Block 2): 
Reading 1 (1 min.) 
Reading 2 (3 min). 
Reading 3 (5 min.) 
Reading 4 (7 min.) 
Reading 5 (9 min.) 
Letter-circling task: seconds 
Notes: 
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Appendix E 
Writing Instructions for Trauma-Fact Condition 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) 
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad ofpaper. Once I leave the room and the door 
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or 
traumatic experience ofyour entire life. Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or 
sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to discuss the details of the event. You 
can write about anything you want. But whatever you choose, it should be something 
that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should be about something you have not 
talked about with others in detail. It is critical, however, that you do not mention your 
feelings toward the experience. Instead, focus only upon the facts of the experience. Let 
yourself go and retell the event as clearly as possible. In other words, write about what 
happened, where it happened, and when it happened without referring to your emotions. 
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Appendix F 
Writing Instructions for Trauma-Emotion Condition 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) 
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door 
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or 
traumatic experience ofyour entire life. Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or 
sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to discuss your deepest feelings about the 
experience. You can write about anything you want. But whatever you choose, it should 
be something that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should be about something 
you have not talked about with others in detail. It is critical, however, that you do not 
mention the trauma itself. Instead, focus only upon your emotions. Let yourself go and 
touch the deepest emotions you have. In other words, write about how you felt at the 
time of the event and how you feel about it now. 
• 
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AppendixG 
Writing Instructions for Trauma-Combination Condition 
(Pennebaker & Beall, 1987) 
I am now going to give you a pen and a pad ofpaper. Once I leave the room and the door 
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about the most upsetting or 
traumatic experience ofyour entire life. Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or 
sentence structure. In your writing, I want you to discuss your deepest thoughts and 
feelings about the experience. You can write about anything you want. But whatever 
you choose, it should be something that has affected you very deeply. Ideally, it should 
be about something you have not talked about with others in detail. It is critical, 
however, that you let yourself go and touch those deepest emotions and thoughts that you 
have. In other words, write about what happened and how you felt about it, and how you 
feel about it now. 
.> 
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AppendixH
 
Writing Instructions for Control Condition
 
I am now going to give you a pen and pad of paper. Once I leave the room and the door 
is closed, I want you to write continuously for 10 minutes about your campus bedroom. 
Don't worry about grammar, spelling, or sentence structure. In your writing, I want you 
to clearly describe what your bedroom looks like at school. It may be your dorm room, 
an apartment bedroom, or your bedroom in a fraternity or sorority house. Describe what 
your bedroom looks like using the most detail possible. You can describe the furniture 
you have, the colors of the room, posters on the wall, and any other descriptive features 
of your bedroom. 
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Appendix I 
Instructions for RB task 
You will now participate in a decision-making task in which you will have the 
opportunity to win and keep real money. As you can see, there are two trays in front of 
you filled with jellybeans. You'll notice that there are currently __ red jellybeans in 
the small tray and red jellybeans in the large tray, as indicated by the index cards. 
So currently, the small tray contains __% red jellybeans, and the large tray contains 
% red jellybeans. 
-- You will have nine trials to draw a red jellybean from either one of the trays. For 
each trial, I will be varying the percentage of red jellybeans in the two trays. If you draw 
a red jellybean, you will win $1, which will be exchanged for real money at the end of the 
study. If you draw a white jellybean, nothing happens, and you neither win nor lose 
money. For each trial, you have the opportunity to select which tray you want to draw 
from. Once you select a tray, I will cover your eyes, and you will draw one jellybean.. 
Do you have any questions? 
For the first trial, you'll notice that the small tray contains __% red jellybeans, and the 
large tray contains __% red jellybeans. Which tray would you like to draw from for 
trial I? 
Participant selects a tray, your partner covers the participant's eyes, you mix up the 
jellybeans, you guide the participant's hand to the tray, and they draw a jellybean. 
Ifred-~ give them a dollar. 
If white-~ say "I'm sorry, it's white. You neither win nor lose money." 
Then go to the nexi trial. Look on your sheet to see what the appropriate percentages are. 
Add/remove jellybeans, and put the appropriate notecards in front of the trays. Don't 
forget to switch the position ofthe trays for each trial!! Read them the percentages 
again, and ask them to draw. Do this for all 9 trials. 
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Appendix J 
Participant # _ 
RB Recording Sheet 
Trial % Jellybeans in 
Large/Small tray 
Participant's Choice Win or lose 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 .> 
8 
9 
---
•
Rational and Emotive DiscloSW'C 65 
Participant # _AppendixK 
Demographics 
I. Age (in years): _ 2. Gender: M F (please circle one) 
3. Year in school: I 2 3 4 5 (please circle one)~ 4. Major	 _ 
5.. What is your ethnjcity?(please circle all that-apply) 
a. Caucasion 
b. Atiican-Amencan 
c. Asian-American 
d. Asian-Indian-American 
e. Pacific Islander
 
f Asian-Indian ~ .
 
g. LatinolLatina 
h. Asian 
1. Native American 
J. International Student	 country oforigin 
k. Other 
..
 
6. What social groups do you belong to on campus (please circle all that apply) 
a. volunteer organization 
b. church group 
c. academic club 
d. fraternity or sorority 
e. musical group
 
f.. varsity sports team
 
7.	 How often, 
.) 
if at all, do you engage in personal writing (whether it be in a 
. journal/diary, writing poetry. writing poetry/stories outside ofclass, etc.). 
a. Once or more a week 
b. A couple of times a month 
c. Afew times a year 
d. Never 
e. Other	 _ 
;
.­
'. 
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" 
For this study personal writing i3 defined 83 any type or writing that you do because it is a way to ref1«t 
on your lire. For thi, study we are not including wo"' that you've done ror schooling. 
1. Would you define personal writing in another way than my definition? 
Yes l	 No 2
.. 
2.	 If you would define .personal writing in another way, what is your definition of personal writing? 
J.	 At some time in your life have you ever done personal writing - any type of writing that you do as a way to 
reflect on your life?
 
Yes 1 [fyes, answer questions # 4-7.
 
No 2 Ifno, why you have NEVER do~e personal writing at any ~ime in your life.
 
4.	 Have you ever kept a diary or a diary? 
Yes....... I No........2 
5.	 There are many reasons for personal writing. Which of these reasons fit you. Please circle the number 
corresponding to the statemept ~n the left side of the column. Circle all that apply. 
To document, explore, escape from, or reflect on extremely painful memories 
or feelin~s and how separate you feel from these feelin~s, includin~ an~er 
1 
To record daily events, hold onto writing for a lifetime, and to write innocent 
stories 
2 
To access the self - to have a place where I can think about things related to 
me 
J 
To reflect on social chan~e or social justice 4 
To provide tem~'Gl y relieti'ventilation ofdaily stress/smaller issues (7.5%) 5 
To telJ the truth 6 
To break the isolation of feeling alone 7 
To give myself a boos S 
To hide secret acts. feelin~s and thou~ts in the writin~ 9 
To complete creative writin2 or freewritin~ at school 10 
To communicate with or write about God ] ] 
To reflect or solve problems with friends or relationships 12 
To share thoughtslfeelin~s1daily life with others in letters or gifts 13 
Other reasons: please list the other reasons. 14 
6.	 Which of the above reasons is your main reason for doing personal writing? _ 
7.	 Please let us know anything else related to your personal writing. 
•
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Appendix L 
Verbal Debriefmg 
[Note to experimenter-ifat anytime you fiel /ike you want help-immediately 
call Dr. Ernst (X-3907 or 820-1099). Ifhe cannot be reached then call the 
health services at X-3 107.] 
Thank you very much for participating in this study. Your participation will help us to 
better understand the physiological and cognitive processes underlying disclosure. I will 
be giving you a debriefing form before you leave that will further explain what this study
. . . 
IS eXamlmng. 
Right now, however, I want to specifically thank you for agreeing to write 
about a personal experience. As previously mentioned, everything you have written will 
remain confidential and anonymous. Often times if we write about something upsetting, 
we may experience feelings of sadness, anger, or pain, or we may experience new 
feelings that we had not previously experienced. 
(1) Did the writing exercise conjure up feelings for you? 
[Regardless ofwhether they say yes or no the experimenter is to move on to 
the next question.] 
(2) Is there anything you would like to talk about? 
[If the answer is yes-then the experimenter is to listen to what the 
participant has to MY.] 
What ifthe participant doesn't seem hysterical: 
A. let the participant talk. 
B. At the end say something like, "Thanks for sharing those feelings with 
me. Your participation is really appreciated and as I mentioned above, 
very valuable for understanding the repercussions of traumatic events." Go 
to (3) below. 
Imagine that the subject seems upset: 
A. let the participant talk. At the end say something like, "You seem upset 
to me. Would you like to have a chance to talk with my supervisor, Dr. 
John Ernst, or someone at the health services? If they say yes, then 
contact Ernst (X-3907 or 820-1099) or health services (X-3107). If they 
ask for Ernst and he is not available call health services. If they don't 
answer and the participant seems truly hysterical and/or suicidal (we 
• 
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don't anticipate suicidal ideation-indeed the literature suggests that disclosing 
a traumatic event is likely to make the participant feel better) then call 
the PATH Crisis Center @ 827-4005. If they say no, ask them if they want 
you to call a friend to come pick them up. 
(3) Is there someone you can talk to about this experience if you want to do 
so later on? 
Ifthey say no-then refer them to the contact numbers for Dr. Ernst and the 
Health Services Center. 
(4) If at any time upon leaving should you want to talk to someone about any 
feelings that this study may have evoked, please feel free to contact 
Dr. John Ernst, social psychologist at Illinois Wesleyan University, or 
IWU Counseling Services, located in the basement of Magill Hall. The 
numbers for both places are on the debriefing form I am about to give you. Thank you 
again for your participation. 
[After reading the debriefingform the participant will be asked ifthey 
have any further questions, thankedfor their participation, and dismissed.} 
**Don 'tforget to give the participant their debriefingform and informed consentform 
before they leave.. 
.> 
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Appendix M 
Debriefmg 
Thank you very much for your participation! The main purpose of this study was to 
examine the events surrounding written disclosure of traumatic experiences. Research conducted 
by Epstein suggests the existence of two distinct modes of processing: rational and experiential. 
The rational mode ofprocessing is driven by logic and deliberative thought involving higher 
brain functioning, whereas the experiential mode ofprocessing is driven by emotions and 
automatic heuristics involving lower brain functioning. For example, solving math problems 
would more heavily invoke the rational system, whereas painting a picture would more heavily 
rely upon the experiential system. It is possible that writing about the facts surrounding a 
traumatic event invokes rational processing, whereas writing about the emotions surrounding a 
traumatic event invokes experiential processing. We will be examining this possibility by 
observing the relationship between your writing sample and the decisions you made in the jelly 
bean and visual performance tasks. 
In addition to self-report and behavioral measures, people's physiological responses have 
often been examined as a way to learn more about their psychological processing. Berntson and 
Cacioppo propose that events involving high brain functioning involve one type of autonomic 
activation whereas lower brain functioning involves another. We will examine this hypothesis by 
looking at your physiological reactivity throughout the study. 
This research is valuable because it will help us better understand the cognitive and 
physiological processes underlying disclosure. Disclosure is a central aspect in many therapies 
and every day encounters. It is our hope that our research will shed some light on the hidden 
processes that accompany emotional versus factual disclosure. 
It is very important that you not talk about the specifics of this study with other students 
at IWU. You are doing this study with lots of students and it's important that everyone comes ' 
with the same infonnation. We don't want some students and not others to know about specific 
tasks or questions. However, you can say that you participated in a study that examined the 
cognitive and physiological processes underlying disclosure. 
If you have questions in the future, please contact John Ernst, Ph.D. at (309) 556-3907. 
In addition, if you would like to discuss any feelings that this study may have invoked, please 
contact Dr. Ernst or the counseling services at IWU (free services): (309)-556-3052. 
If you are interested in this study and would like further information, the following is 
recommended reading used in this study: 
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential information processing 
styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 76, 972-987. 
Pennebaker, J. W. Emotion, Disclosure, & Health. Washington, DC: American Psychological 
Association. 
Thanks again for your participation! Your help is of great service as we explore the 
cognitive and physiological processes underlying disclosure. 
